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Summary: With an eye on the changes of immense if not radical propor-
tions that European integration has undergone in the past fi ve years, 
are there any grounds for revisiting the process of fl exible integration 
and using some of its potentials for the benefi t of integration in the fu-
ture? This is the main question of this article, the purpose of which, in 
contrast to the bulk of the literature in this fi eld, is not so much to de-
scribe or conduct a textual analysis of the fl exibility clauses of various 
treaties, but to understand the deeper or background reasons why 
fl exibility in the EU has developed as it has. The article consists of 
three parts. The fi rst part traces the historical development of fl exible 
integration. This is followed by a study of the reasons why fl exibility 
has remained on the margins of the integration process. Finally, hav-
ing examined the EU’s relatively non-fl exible past and the reasons for 
this, the focus moves to its present and future.
The main focus of this article is the question of what to make of fl ex-
ible integration in the EU after the big bang enlargement and the failure 
of documentary constitutionalisation? The purpose, in contrast with the 
bulk of the literature in this fi eld, is not so much to describe or conduct 
a textual analysis of the fl exibility clauses in the various treaties, but to 
understand those deeper or background reasons why fl exibility in the 
EU has developed as it has. The discussion will be broadly broken down 
into three parts. In the fi rst part, we will trace the historical development 
of fl exible integration. This will be followed by a study of the reasons 
why fl exibility has remained on the margins of the integration process. 
Finally, having examined the EU’s relatively non-fl exible past and the 
reasons for it, we will turn to its present and future. With an eye on the 
changes of immense if not radical proportions that European integration 
has undergone in the past fi ve years, are there any grounds for revisiting 
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the process of fl exible integration and using some of its potentials for the 
benefi t of integration in the future?
Three Orders of Flexibility
What is fl exible integration? This is a preliminary, defi nitional ques-
tion that must be answered before embarking on a more detailed exami-
nation of its historical evolution in the context of European integration. 
Following the defi nition crafted by de la Serre and Wallace, we suggest 
understanding fl exibility as a means of organising diversity between the 
constituent entities in European integration.1 Flexibility should therefore 
be best imagined as a continuum of different instances in which not all 
Member States are subject to uniform rules within the scope of EU com-
petences. These instances can be of a different intensity subject to the 
scope and depth of exceptions established in favour of one or more Mem-
ber State. Progressing from the least to the most fl exible solutions, one 
can distinguish between three different orders of fl exibility. 
First-order fl exibility covers a range of legislative, executive and ju-
dicial regulation techniques, both formal and semi-formal, within a uni-
form primary EU law, the regulatory outcomes of which (intentionally) 
fall short of requiring and establishing uniformity. They are normally ex-
plicitly, but also implicitly, authorised at the level of primary EU law and 
are usually executed in the form of secondary EU law. Those explicitly 
authorised by primary EU law fi rstly comprise legislative acts of different 
regulatory intensity. These are regulations and directives, the purpose 
of which is either unifi cation or merely harmonisation of national laws. 
Secondly, there are specifi c fl exible legislative techniques known as mini-
mum or partial harmonisation2 that take place within the secondary leg-
islative acts themselves. These can also provide for even further means of 
fl exibility, such as options, derogation clauses and different transitional 
periods of implementation for different Member States, though naturally 
within the limits and hence with the implicit authorisation of primary EU 
law. These formal fl exible regulatory techniques also include interpreta-
tive solutions, both legislative as well as judicial, whereby the construc-
tion of a particular term in secondary EU legislation is left to Member 
1  F de la Serre and H Wallace, ‘Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation in the European 
Union: Placebo rather than Panacea’ (1997) Notre Europe Research and Policy Paper No 2. 
2  Minimum harmonisation is provided for in art 137(5) EC (social policy), art 153(3) EC 
(consumer protection), art 176 EC (environmental protection), and in (the rather different) 
art 95(4)-(9) EC (internal market). Minimum harmonisation may also be based on Com-
munity secondary legislation, either expressly or by implication. On the latter possibility 
see Case C-11/92, ex p Gallaher, [1993] ECR I-3545. For more, see Francesco de Cecco, 
‘Room to Manoeuvre? Minimum Harmonization and Fundamental Rights’ (2006) 43 CML 
Rev 9-30.
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States. Finally, fi rst-order fl exibility also encompasses so-called soft law, 
ie semi-formal regulation with whose help the Commission, in particu-
lar, co-ordinates Member States and steers their activities towards good 
practice without proposing binding legislative or executive acts, either 
because the latter is inopportune or, in the light of existing differences 
between Member States, simply impossible.3    
Second-order fl exibility is already more intense, as it occurs, in con-
trast with fi rst-order fl exibility, at the level of primary EU law in the form 
of derogations from it. Typical examples, which will be presented in detail 
below, comprise so-called safeguard clauses, often notorious instances of 
various opt-outs with potential opt-ins and other usually protocol-based 
derogations in favour of a selected Member State. Partly relying on a clas-
sifi cation of fl exibility provided by Tuytschaever,4 second-order fl exibility 
can be accordingly best described as specifi c, as it is established in fa-
vour of a particular, very rarely more than one, Member State; narrow in 
scope, since it is limited to a single and narrowly defi ned policy exception; 
negative, as it exempts a Member State from otherwise uniformly valid 
primary EU rules; permanent, as, in principle, it is unlimited in time; and 
ultimately of an exceptional nature, since it is not anticipated that it will 
be followed by other Member States, and is therefore without an organ-
ised procedure for coming into being.  
These features set second-order fl exibility apart from the stronger 
third-order fl exibility, also commonly known as differentiated integration. 
This, as the ensuing discussion will show, is still a relatively unsettled 
phenomenon. There are roughly four competing models of third-order 
fl exibility, which renders a general all-inclusive defi nition more diffi cult. 
These include:5 the à la carte model,6 the multi-speed Europe,7 the Eu-
rope of concentric circles8 and the model of enhanced co-operation that 
3  Linda Senden, SoftLaw in European Community Law (Hart, Oxford 2004).
4  Filip Tuytschaever, ‘The changing conception of differentiation in European Union Law’ 
(PhD thesis, EUI 1998), in particular chapter 5.
5  For the purpose of clarity, especially as the same phenomena have had very different 
labels attached to them by different authors, the categorisation of differentiated integration 
designed by Alexander Stubb will be relied on, ‘Categorization of Differentiated Integration’ 
(1996) Journal of Common Market Studies 285.
6  ‘Respected Member States are able to pick and choose, as from a menu, in which policy 
area they would like to participate, whilst at the same time holding only to a minimum 
number of common objectives. ’ Ibid 285.
7  ‘The pursuit of common objectives is driven by a core group of Member States which are 
both able and willing to go further, the underlying assumption being that the others will 
follow later.’ Ibid 285.
8  ‘A model that admits to unattainable differences within the integrative structure by allow-
ing permanent or irreversible separation between a hard core and less developed integrative 
units.’ Ibid 285.
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is currently institutionalised in primary EU law.9 These all share a con-
ception of third-order fl exibility which is general, for it must involve more 
Member States; broad in scope, as it is usually conceived for a large 
policy sector; and positive, since it enables capable or interested Member 
States to integrate more quickly and further. 
Genealogy of Flexible Integration
The described instances of fl exible integration have emerged incre-
mentally and at different points of time in the history of European inte-
gration. While conventional wisdom locates the origins of fl exibility in 
the early 1970s, this is only partly correct as they in fact date back to 
the very roots of integration. Some of them were already present in the 
Treaty of Rome. Besides the distinction between different legislative acts 
(fi rst-order fl exibility), this Treaty also contained a number of safeguard 
clauses and at least six of the ten protocols annexed to it dealt with 
derogations.10 While the latter provided for exceptions at the level of pri-
mary law, they should not be equated with strong instances of fl exibility, 
such as the opt-outs of a later date, as they were limited to certain very 
specifi c national trade-based peculiarities.11 At the outset of integration, 
fl exibility thus occupied a rather narrow scope and did not play a major 
role. This is understandable as priority was given to means contributing 
to further integration and hence to increased uniformity. In the context 
of the relative homogeneity of the six founding Member States and the 
rather narrow original scope of Community competences, this appeared 
both feasible as well as desirable.
However, it did not take long for this situation to begin to change. 
With the fi rst wave of enlargement at the beginning of the 1970s, the 
old homogeneous Community came to an end. With three new Member 
States, the number of divergent political and economic interests com-
plicated the existing, by and large, still unanimous decision-making in 
the Union and made political stalemates part of its daily reality. It was 
in 1974, during one of the particularly fi erce stand-offs caused by Brit-
ain’s staunch opposition to the harmonisation of banking legislation and 
company law,12 that the fi rst open political call for differentiated integra-
9  Currently Title IV of the TEU Lisbon.
10  D Hanf, ‘Flexibility Clauses in the Founding Treaties, from Rome to Nice’ in de Witte, 
Hanf and Vos (eds), The many faces of differentiation in EU law (Intersentia, 2001) 7.
11  Ibid 8. These, for example, included the Protocol on German Internal Trade which ab-
solved the then West Germany from instituting the EU required customs regime with East-
ern Germany; the Banana Protocol, the Protocol on Luxembourg, etc.
12  CD Ehlermann, ‘Differentiation, Flexibility, Closer Co-operation: The New Provisions of 
the Amsterdam Treaty’ (1998) 4 (3) European Law Journal 246-270; SM Colino, ‘Towards 
greater fl exibility or a deadlock’ The Federal Trust Online Paper 24/04.
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tion as the strongest means of fl exibility was launched by the German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt. He introduced the idea of a multi-speed Europe 
according to which the Union would be divided into two groups of more 
and less advanced Member States, so that the former could achieve their 
common objectives more quickly and effectively, while the latter would 
follow when ready or willing to do so.13 Only a year later in 1975, the 
proposal was seconded by the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans 
and elevated to the level of the European Council. In his Report, while 
admittedly taking a very cautious and hence rather conservative stand on 
differentiated integration, he pointed to the growing social and economic 
differences between Member States and warned that simply disregarding 
them and insisting on a synchronised pace of integration could put the 
overall process of integration in peril.14
However, both of these appeals for differentiated integration fell upon 
the deaf ears of Member States as well as EU institutions and were conse-
quently, together with the entire idea of fl exible integration, set aside for 
a couple of years only to resurge even more strongly in the 1980s. This 
decade saw two landmark events. One was the enlargement of the EU 
with three further Member States,15 while the other, which was certainly 
not unrelated to the fi rst, was the adoption of the Single European Act 
(hereinafter SEA) amending the founding Treaties.16 The latter introduced 
two major institutional reforms which inter alia contained clear moves 
towards fl exible integration. In this respect, the provisions of Article 100a 
(4) and 130t TEC17 should especially be pointed out. Departing from the 
established case law of the ECJ, these allowed Member States, subject 
to prescribed conditions, to adopt or retain different regulatory stand-
ards even when a given fi eld was already harmonised.18 In addition, a 
number of more “fl exible” legislative techniques, which are designated 
above as fi rst-order fl exibility techniques, were laid down in the text of 
the Treaty.19
In the 1980s, the genie of fl exibility was let out of the bottle. Its 
consequences were felt in the SEA, but this only paved the way for the 
Treaty of Maastricht (hereinafter ToM) where fl exibility was recognised to 
a degree unseen before. The ToM, fi rst of all, represented a break with 
the pre-existing supranationally driven Community method by creating 
13  Walker, ‘Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union’ (1998) 4 (4) 
European Law Journal 364; Colino (n 12) footnote 8, referring to Nomden (1998).
14  Ibid.
15  Greece joined the Union in 1981 whereas Spain and Portugal followed fi ve years later. 
16  SEA came into force in 1987.
17  Now art 95 and 176 TEC.
18  Hanf (n 10) 10.
19  Ibid 10-11. 
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the (in)famous pillar structure. This latter introduced so-called structural 
variability,20 whereby different policy sectors are governed by different de-
cision-making rules. However, these do not discriminate between Member 
States and must consequently be distinguished from fl exible integration 
in the classical sense as defi ned here. However, the latter was not ab-
sent from the ToM. On the contrary, preserving the established fi rst-order 
fl exibility, the ToM introduced new instances of second-order fl exibility21 
and, moreover, took integration to the very brink of third-order fl exibility. 
Indeed, with the creation of EMU in which not all Member States partici-
pated, due to either objective or subjective reasons, with the British opting 
out from the Protocol on Social Policy, and fi nally with the conclusion of 
the Schengen Agreement by only some Member States outside the Com-
munity framework, the lines of different regulatory regimes in larger policy 
fi elds with necessarily adjusted institutional solutions were drawn up, 
foreshadowing the advent of fully-blown differentiated integration.
This possibility again stirred the political imagination of European 
stake-holders, who soon produced an avalanche of political visions of 
possible models of third-order fl exibility. It all began with the Lamers-
Schäuble initiative which called for European integration based on vari-
able geometry where EU Member States would be divided between those 
forming the core, an avant-garde of integration, which could also pre-
sumably be closed to those delegated to the periphery.22 This provoked an 
immediate reaction from the head of the French government who promot-
ed integration in the form of three concentric circles which, in contrast 
with the German model, would be less rigid and more policy-sector rather 
than state based.23 These two proposals, while endorsing differentiation, 
concurrently insisted on the need to preserve a common European inte-
gration architectural whole.24 This was, however, absent from the British 
proposal of integration à la carte, defended by the then Prime Minister 
John Major, who advocated a very small scope of shared European poli-
cies. Beyond this, Member States could freely choose to participate in 
those policy sectors which they found opportune.25     
20  Robert Harmsen, ‘A European Union of Variable Geometry: Problems and Perspectives’ 
(1994) 45 (109) N Ir Legal Q. 
21  Hanf (n 10) 16-18. The most notorious were the protocol on the acquisition of second 
homes in Denmark and the Irish abortion protocol.
22  Lamers and Schauble, ‘Refl ections on European Foreign Policy’ Document of the CDU/
CSU in the German Bundestag (1994). Academics differ as to whether their proposal was an 
example of variable geometry, Ehlermann (n 12) or concentric circle, Walker (n 13).
23  Balladur’s proposal, Walker (n 13), Ehlermann (n 12), Gillespie, ‘The Promise and Prac-
tice of Flexibility’, in Tonra (ed), Amsterdam, What the Treaty Means (Dublin 1997).
24  Ehlermann (n 12).
25  Federal Trust Report on fl exible integration in the EU, ‘Flexibility and the Future of the 
European Union’, October 2005. 
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All this political ado exercised in the lead-up to the Amsterdam IGC 
had little direct effect on the national delegations until the joint Franco-
German intervention which put forward an offi cial proposal to incorpo-
rate a general clause opening up the possibility of differentiated integra-
tion in certain policy fi elds.26 The proposal was met with approval and the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), while scrapping the British opt-out from the 
social protocol and preserving the EMU and Schengen opt-outs,27 under 
the title of closer co-operation furnished a legal basis to enable a certain 
number of Member States which were both able and desired to integrate 
in chosen policy fi elds further and more quickly than the others, to do 
so.28 Politically mooted but crushed at its birth in the early 1970s, it had 
become a tangible treaty-based option 20 years later. This has led some 
to announce that the ToA had made differentiated integration an intrinsic 
part of Europe’s constitutional structure.29 A certain plausibility was lent 
to this belief by the fact that both the Treaty of Nice, whose negotiation 
was again conducted amid appeals for more fl exibility from top national 
offi cials and other wise men,30 and also the failed Constitutional Treaty 
both preserved the legal basis for enhanced co-operation and even eased 
the conditions for the launch of the process and enlarged the scope of 
policy fi elds in which this type of fl exibility is possible. 31 
Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon, as the latest product of the semi-per-
manent process of Treaty revision,32 remains rather ambivalent as far 
26  Ehlermann (n 12) 250.
27  With the ToA, Schengen was integrated within the Treaty framework and made part of 
the Acquis. It was introduced (partly) in the fi rst pillar title IV, which provided for a judicial 
review by the ECJ in the form of preliminary rulings subject to the Member State’s prior 
agreement. The ToA thus effectively also introduced judicial fl exibility. Hanf (n 10) 19.  
28  Core states, ready and willing to go further; less advanced Member States and accession 
countries.
29  Hanf (n 10) footnote 88.
30  For example, see the Wise Men’s (also known as Dehaene) report ‘Institutional implications 
of enlargement’ submitted by Jean-Luc Dehaene, Richard von Weizsaeker and Lord David 
Simon, available at <http://europa.eu.int/igc2000/repoct99_en.htm>; Joschka Fischer’s 
famous Humboldt University speech ‘Quo vadis Europa?’ <http://www.auswaertigesamt.
de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/reden/2000/000512-FromConfederacyto.html>; Chirac’s 
‘Our Europe’ response <http://www.bundestag.de/geschichte/gastredner/chirac/chirac1.
html>; and Tony Blair’s intervention on ‘Europe’s political future’ <http://www.fco.gov.
uk/resources/en/speech/2002/06/-europe-s-political-fut-new04913> all last accessed 20 
August 2008.
31  Pursuant to the ToA, the proposal to launch closer co-operation had to be made by a 
majority of Member States. Moreover, closer co-operation was excluded from the 2nd pillar 
(common foreign and security policy), where a mechanism of positive abstention was used 
instead.
32  B de Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-
Permanent Treaty Revision Process’ in Beaumont, Lyons and Walker (eds), Convergence and 
Divergence in European Public Law (Hart, 2002). 
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as recognition of fl exibility is concerned. On the one hand, it presents 
a signifi cant departure from it. It merges the pillar structure and the 
two heads of Community and Union into a single legal and institutional 
framework of the European Union, putting its structural differentiation 
to an end. On the other hand, it does not just keep the existing examples 
of second-order fl exibility but multiplies them by allowing opt-outs from 
policy fi elds where an exception to one-size-fi ts-all solutions would have 
been hardly imaginable before. The most conspicuous examples of this 
kind are certainly the British and Polish opt-outs from the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, ie from a long awaited document which contains 
EU human rights that have been traditionally represented as universal, 
being common to all Member States and stemming from their shared 
constitutional traditions.33 This and indeed the overall number of deroga-
tions claimed by the UK at the level of primary EU law has already led 
some to wonder whether a critical mass of opt-outs has perhaps already 
been reached if not surpassed.34 As far as eventual third-order fl exibility 
is concerned, the Treaty of Lisbon has basically kept the regime estab-
lished by the Treaty of Nice untouched.  
Four Defi ning Features of Flexible Integration
Having conducted a genealogical analysis of the process of fl exible 
integration, what we are interested in next is whether certain elements 
can be singled out which defi ne it and can be treated as constitutive of 
it on the basis of its evolution over the last fi ve decades. What are the 
common features of the fl exibility process? Has it been a coherent en-
terprise or can it only be regarded, as has been powerfully argued, as 
a non-project with an obvious lack of coherence that has mainly been 
driven by contingency, ambiguity and disagreement?35  In our view, the 
process of fl exible integration can be coherently structured around four 
defi ning features.
First, the process has been underlined by a very explicit telos that 
has acted as its unifying force and has brought all the different practi-
cal instances of fl exibility within a single objective of fi nding the most 
appropriate means for managing diversity in European integration. Sec-
ondly, the origins of the fl exibility process can be equally accounted for 
in a coherent manner. Three main, so-called, triggers of fl exibility can 
33  For more on ECJ case law on human rights protection, see M Avbelj, ‘European Court of 
Justice and the Question of Value Choices: Fundamental Human Rights as an Exception to 
the Freedom of Movements of Goods’, Jean Monnet Working Paper No 06/04 <http://www.
jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040601.html>.
34  ‘EU Treaty Negotiations Proceed Slowly’ EuObserver (19 September 2007).
35  Walker (n 13) 374 and Colino (n 12) 5 have similarly observed that especially in the pe-
riod preceding Amsterdam the “sightings” of fl exibility did not follow any coherent line.
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be identifi ed. These have in practice operated both separately as well as 
jointly. The fi rst of these are the different schemes of justice to which 
Member States adhere and which are expressed, as Scharpf has argued, 
in those basic differences in national economic conditions, institutions, 
policy legacies and normative preferences.36 Flexible integration is ancil-
lary to these differences and hence their function, which means that the 
bigger they are the greater the need for fl exibility. The historical trajectory 
of different orders of fl exibility is the best evidence of this. In the past, 
every single enlargement contributed to the growing heterogeneity of in-
tegration and sooner or later spurred on appeals for fl exibility which, as 
we have seen, usually resulted in certain clear consequences in practice 
both at the level of secondary and primary EU law.  
The second trigger of fl exibility is the depth of integration. As we had 
the chance to observe, following the ToM, which signifi cantly enlarged the 
scope of EU competences by supplementing what was a predominantly 
economic dimension of the Community with a number of other policies,37 
pressure for stronger, second and even third-order fl exibility mounted. 
The fi nal trigger is qualifi ed majority voting. A shift from the unanimity 
requirement to a qualifi ed majority in decision-making processes in EU 
institutions increases the likelihood of demands for second-order fl ex-
ibility. A Member State which fears that it could be outvoted on certain 
policy issues, which for various reasons fi gure large in domestic affairs, 
might move to secure an appropriate derogation or opt-out to prevent 
such political surprises in advance.  
Thirdly, the fl exibility process can also be seen, though perhaps 
counter-intuitively, as coherent due to its glaringly incoherent results. 
Especially over the last three decades, we have been able to detect a huge 
discrepancy between political enthusiasm and ambitions to introduce 
more fl exibility in integration on the one hand, and very modest practical 
outcomes on the other. This is particularly true of third-order fl exibility, 
which has occupied even the most important political fi gures in Europe 
and transformed them into political visionaries, yet ultimately with little 
practical effect. While fi rst and second-order fl exibility have been received 
with fairly few diffi culties and have appeared more and more frequently 
in EU founding Treaties and other legislative instruments, third-order 
fl exibility has had a rather different fate. Since its explicit formal written 
recognition in the ToA, it has remained a dead letter. In their decade-
long existence, the provisions on enhanced co-operation have never been 
36  F Scharpf, ‘Problem Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU’, Po-
litical Science Series, Feb 2006 < http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_107.pdf>.  
37  These ranged from social policies within the Community pillar to foreign, security, jus-
tice and home affairs policies in the two intergovernmental pillars.
140 Matej Avbelj: Revisiting Flexible Integration in Times of Post-enlargement...
applied and, moreover, except in two cases their use has not even been 
seriously considered.38 
Inquiring into the reasons for this kind of situation, which one is 
logically expected to do, brings us to the fourth, this time exogenous, co-
herence-enhancing factor of the fl exibility process. The process has taken 
place in an intellectual and political environment which has been openly 
and more than consistently hostile to the idea of fl exibility as such, but 
especially to its strongest version, ie differentiated integration.39 None of 
the narratives of European integration, with the single exception of the 
international law narrative,40 could come to terms with or digest fl ex-
ible integration. This is especially true of those two narratives that have 
dominated the socio-legal construction of European integration. From 
the supranational neo-functionalist perspective, which held a dominant 
position until the late 1980s, differentiated integration would entail an 
interruption of the virtuous spill-over effects from one policy sector into 
another. This would amount to a failure of integration41 and would po-
tentially even signal a return to the old international voluntaristic state-
based paradigm. 
However, from the vantage point of the classical constitutional vi-
sion42 which has replaced the supranational narrative as the dominant 
narrative, differentiated integration not only represents a breakdown of 
integration, it is its outright contradictio in adiecto for it collides with 
its very telos. European integration, with its formal and double-layered 
substantive, yet unwritten, constitution, which makes it literally indistin-
38  The literature quotes two attempted uses of enhanced co-operation. The fi rst allegedly 
happened in 1999 around the time of the Cologne European Council where the proposed 
adoption of the European Company Statute met opposition from Spain; whereas the second 
was mooted in 2001 after the initial Italian reluctance to agree on the framework decision 
instituting the European Arrest Warrant. See JM de Areilza, ‘The reform of enhanced co-
operation rules: towards less fl exibility?’ in de Witte, Hanf and Vos (eds), The many faces of 
differentiation in EU law (Intersentia, 2001) 33; and D Thym, ‘“United in Diversity” – The 
Integration of Enhanced Co-operation into the European Constitutional Order’ 6 (11) Ger-
man Law Journal 1737. 
39  Jo Shaw speaks of an overall orthodoxy of hostility to fl exibility, see J Shaw, ‘Relating 
Constitutionalism and Flexibility in the European Union’, in de Burca and Scott (eds), Con-
stitutional Change in the EU, From Uniformity to Flexibility (Hart, 2000). 
40  A Sepos, in ‘Differentiated integration in the EU: The Position of Small Member States’, 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS No 2005/17, correctly notes that from a liberal intergovernmen-
tal perspective, which is a special version of the international law narrative, differentiation 
is easy to explain by Member States’ craving for power and the consequent enhancement 
of their positions. 
41  Ibid.
42  For a more in-depth discussion of classical constitutionalism in the EU and the evolu-
tion of EU constitutionalisms in general, see M Avbelj, ‘Questioning EU Constitutionalisms’ 
(2008) 9 (1) German Law Journal.
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guishable from constitutional federal states,43 is pursuant to the classi-
cal constitutional vision defi ned by an imperative of an ever closer union 
between the peoples of Europe, which means that it should proceed in 
just one way.44 As a result, harmonisation, if not unifi cation, should be 
its main paradigm. All differences and diversity existing in integration 
are accordingly, more or less, perceived as obstacles, fi rst to free trade, 
but ultimately to integration as such.45 Incrementally, but steadily, they 
should give way to a supreme Community law requiring uncompromised 
uniformity in its application across all Member States. 
Introducing more fl exibility in integration or even allowing its con-
stituent entities to integrate at different speeds in different fi elds of in-
tegration would openly defy the very purpose of the entire constitutional 
enterprise. This latter was launched precisely with the opposite objective: 
namely to further integration not to loosen it.46 On the basis of statist 
constitutional federal experiences, to which classical EU constitutional-
ism is most indebted and where it in fact originates from,47 it has been 
presumed that as a constitution confers unity and order in a statist en-
vironment, the same virtuous effects should come about in the suprana-
tional environment as well. Consequently, for many years the process of 
European integration has been conducted in a spirit of furthering unity 
and uniformity, and constitutionalism has been selected as the most ap-
propriate tool for this. Integration has fallen prey to the so-called unity 
dogma with a natural tendency and strong presumption towards uniform-
ity.48 This explains why fl exibility has only fi gured on the margins and 
why realistically speaking no organised form of differentiated integration 
could come into being. Even in those few instances where its use was at 
least ostensibly seriously contemplated, it was portrayed either as a last 
resort measure49 or was seized upon as a means of exerting pressure in 
negotiations against more reluctant Member States under the threat of 
43  JHH Weiler, ‘Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg’ in Nicolaidis 
(ed), The Federal Vision, Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the 
European Union (OUP, 2001) 56.
44  Deirdre Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces’ 
(1993) 30 CMLRev,  67.
45  Avbelj (n 42).
46  MP Maduro, ‘How Constitutional Can the European Union Be? The Tension Between 
Intergovernmentalism and Constitutionalism in the European Union’, in Weiler and Eis-
gruber (eds), ‘Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective’ Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 5/04 <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040501-18.html> 
accessed 13 August 2007 6.
47  M Avbelj, ‘Pitfalls of (Comparative) Constitutional Law for European Integration’ Eric 
Stein Working Paper 1/2008 <http://www.csesp.cz/en/working_papers.php>. 
48  CD Ehlermann, ‘How Flexible is Community Law? An Unusual Approach to the concept 
of “two speeds”’ (1984) 82 Mich L Rev 1274, 1288. 
49  In fact, the relevant Treaty provisions stipulate it as such.
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exclusion or second-class membership. It has been very rarely, though 
over time more so, seen as an opportunity for European integration.50  
The Europe of Today: Post-enlargement and the Lustration of 
Constitutionalism    
With an insight into the historical development and also causes and 
internal dynamics of fl exible integration, we are now well equipped to ad-
dress the central question of this paper. What should be made of fl exible 
integration in the EU of today? Is all that has been said above still fully 
valid for European integration as it presently stands? This would mean 
that fl exibility, especially that of the third-order kind, remains largely a 
non-issue. On the other hand, have there been changes which merit the 
re-opening of the fl exibility debate and contemplating its practical poten-
tial anew? 
As is well known, European integration in the last fi ve years has 
witnessed two major political events which have had a fundamental im-
pact on its overall political, economic and legal nature. The fi rst was its 
enlargement from 15 to 27 Member States. The second, which followed 
the fi rst, and which is certainly not unrelated to it, is the rise and fall of 
documentary constitutionalism. This has resulted in a strong blow to 
the dominant constitutional perspective of integration, which has literally 
been forced to the very brink of lustration. 
If our analysis of the fl exibility process conducted above is correct, 
the changes in European integration just described affect two of its four 
defi ning elements. The fi rst cuts through the triggers of fl exibility and 
concerns more concretely the heterogeneity between the constituent en-
tities of integration. Heterogeneity has been increased by every single 
enlargement. This is a rule that has so far known no exception, and the 
latest big bang enlargement offers us no reason to conclude the opposite. 
On the contrary, it is this enlargement, more than any other, that must be 
recognised as the biggest and simultaneously most diversity-augmenting 
in the entire history of the EU. Its vastness is not so much due to quan-
tity, even though the number of Member States has almost doubled, as to 
quality. European integration with enlargement to the East defi nitely tore 
down the Iron Curtain and by doing so integrated the-post communist 
states which historically, provided there is such a thing, had belonged to 
a common European cultural space but had been subsequently excluded 
from it for half a century. 
This has inevitably had a strong effect on them and made them ob-
jectively different from Western European countries, to use still a very 
50  For a more optimistic view, see Tuytschaever (n 4). 
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much vital cold-war terminological cliché. There are differences which 
can be measured in economic terms such as the Eastern block being 
much poorer and less economically developed, while there are others 
which cannot because they pertain to the systemic characteristics of the 
society as a whole. These latter differences, though much less visible and 
harder to identify, are equally, if not even more, important. They concern 
the quality of democracy, the presence or absence of legal and political 
culture and ultimately boil down to the most elementary, but in practice 
the most resilient and enduring, differences in the people’s mentality. 
To cut a long story short, European integration before and after 2004 
is simply not the same thing. It is now truly pervaded by far-reaching 
social, economic, legal, political, cultural, linguistic, religious and other 
forms of diversity. This new unprecedented scope of diversity must inevi-
tably be expressed in the daily legal and political life of integration, given 
that law and politics depend on the social substratum that they regulate 
and from which they grow. If in the widest social sense European integra-
tion has undergone a transformation from the relatively socially homoge-
neous six original Member States to an objectively socially heterogeneous 
27 Member States, then the EU can no longer plausibly follow the same 
linear path of integration which knows only one direction and ultimately 
operates on the basis of the principle that, one way or another, one size 
must fi t all. In short, the EU reality, post big-bang enlargement, certainly 
speaks in favour of a more fl exible type of integration.
Interestingly, we come to the same conclusion when examining the 
EU’s recent constitutional travail. It had seemed that with Maastricht’s 
creation of the pillar structure, which was believed to have blown integra-
tion into bits and pieces,51 the classical constitutional vision and its unity 
dogma had suffered a decisive, if not defi nite, defeat. Instead, we have 
witnessed its full revival. In accordance with the desires of EU constitu-
tionalists expressed way back in the early 1990s, the EU after the Treaty 
of Nice embarked upon fully-fl edged documentary constitutionalisation. 
The classical constitutional vision appeared to be re-vindicated and once 
and for all written down in the genetic code of European integration. 
However, for many unexpectedly, for others not so, the result was rather 
the opposite. The CT was rejected by two founding Member States in 
popular referenda, ie by the people who should have embraced it with 
open hands as it was tailored just for them. In the sobering constitutional 
limbo that followed, new solutions were desperately sought and after a 
two-year period of intense refl ection (the Germans put it best when they 
called it, and with good reason, a Denkpause) a new Reform Treaty, later 
baptised as the Treaty of Lisbon, was agreed upon. 
51  Curtin (n 44) 46.
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However, this represented a literal salto mortale.52 In a manner close 
to the lustration of EU constitutionalism, European stakeholders uproot-
ed everything from the text of the Constitutional Treaty, which they had 
only a short while before so vigorously defended, that might in any way 
be reminiscent of the C-word, going even so far as deleting the provisions 
on the EU’s values and symbols.53 Hence, it took only a couple of years 
for the EU constitutional narrative to travel from the long aspired Euro-
pean constitutional skies to the deepest abyss of the EU’s constitutional 
self-denial. Undoubtedly, this journey has seriously discredited the con-
stitutional basis of the unity dogma and the pertaining faith in the indis-
pensability of a linear development towards an ever closer Union. Now 
that this has been done, the biggest hurdle standing in the way of more 
fl exible integration might have been removed or is at least in the process 
of being removed.    
Pros and Cons of Flexible Integration
With the demise of the stifl ing unity dogma underlying the classical 
constitutional vision of integration, and with a concurrent, unprecedent-
ed increase in heterogeneity, the present state of European integration, in 
theory at least, provides fertile soil for a potential new launch of the fl ex-
ibility process in the form of the differentiated integration which interests 
us here.  The time therefore seems to be ripe, but is it in fact opportune 
or even necessary to introduce the strongest version of fl exibility in inte-
gration? What are the possible advantages, but also disadvantages that 
third-order fl exibility could have for European integration as a whole? 
Of the arguments in favour of differentiated integration, the objective 
existence of a growing diversity between constituent entities should be 
mentioned fi rst. Differentiated integration as a diversity-managing mech-
anism takes full account of this diversity, both its positive and negative 
sides. It also tries to fi nd solutions which would preserve it as far as 
possible, while making sure it does not transform itself into a stumbling 
block for integration. In this way, an open decision for differentiated in-
tegration is much preferable to those strategies, typical of the classical 
constitutional vision, which tend to disregard diversity either by down-
playing its true extent or by simply railroading it through uniform EU-
wide solutions. 
First of all, by recognising diversity, differentiated integration can 
give greater legitimacy to the entire process of integration. In so doing, 
as one commentator has noted, it could also increase the democratic 
52  Avbelj (n 42).
53  While paradoxically adding in the same voice that they will nevertheless continue to fl y 
around Europe.
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potential of European integration by showing respect for national demo-
cratic majorities without allowing this majority, as a European minor-
ity, to block the realisation of European majority preferences.54 At the 
same time, such a model of integration could be much more effi cient. At 
present a de facto consensual system has entangled integration in the so-
called politics of incrementalism.55 This is characterised by the practice of 
postponing the most sensitive and burning issues of integration hoping 
that in the future new energy and motives will be found to tackle what 
cannot be achieved at present. While this patient, progressive, consensu-
al synchronised integration certainly has its advantages, after all it made 
integration possible in the fi rst place and brought it to this, especially in 
comparative terms, enviable stage, it also has strong downsides. Consen-
sus, even if only de facto, is a mode of decision-making which favours 
the status quo at the expense of change and progress. Due to its all-or-
nothing effect (either all agree or there is no decision), it enables every 
single participant to block the game for whatsoever marginal reason. As a 
result, the EU has ended up with a stagnant legal, political and economic 
agenda. A brief look at its development over the last two decades almost 
shockingly reveals that EU political debate has had a cyclical charac-
ter56 with a clear lack of signifi cant progress. For instance, in economic 
terms, the fl agship of EU integration, ie the common market, has still not 
been achieved. All attempts to provide the EU with new impetus through 
successive intergovernmental conferences have resulted only in wrestling 
with the decades-old leftovers of the past.57
The EU has thus been paying a huge and increasing price in terms 
of effi ciency, but there are also other injurious side effects. One of these 
concerns transparency. Even those who are very much in favour of the 
present model of integration are ready to concede that it has led to an 
opaque system which is barely legible.58 A second, and perhaps even more 
important effect concerns the issue of the overall stability of integration. 
When differences between Member States are so big that no solution 
which would satisfy everyone can be found, insistence on a particular so-
lution might lead some Members to have recourse to formal mechanisms 
54  Thym (n 38) 1735.
55  See more in M Avbelj, ‘European Constitution-Building Through a Basic Law and Dif-
ferentiation’ in Neuwahl and Haack (eds), Unresolved Issues of the Constitution for Europe 
(Les Editions Themis, 2007).
56  W Wallace and H Wallace, ‘Flying together in a larger and more diverse European Union’ 
Working document of the Scientifi c Council for Government Policy (The Hague 1995) 23.
57  W Weidenfeld and J Janning, ‘Strategy Paper for the International Bertelsmann Forum’ 
in The New Europe – Strategies for Differentiated Integration (Bertelsmann Foundation Pub-
lishers, Gütersloh 1997).
58  R Dehousse, ‘The Unmaking of the Constitution: Lessons from the European Referenda’ 
(2006) 13 Constellations 152-164.
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outside the Treaty framework59 or even to informal, more or less, secret 
dealings behind the scenes.60 This could lead to the erosion of the EU’s 
activities and its incremental disintegration from the outside,61 simulta-
neously having detrimental effects on its democratic pedigree. Conduct-
ing differentiated integration in an organised, transparent way within a 
Treaty framework subject to judicial and parliamentary supervision fol-
lowing rules which have been laid down in advance and agreed upon by 
all appears much more credible and appealing.62 Moreover, in this way 
differentiated integration could be used, in the opinion of many, as a ve-
hicle of change guaranteeing the evolutionary dynamics that European 
integration is in desperate need of.63
However, although arguments in favour of differentiated integration 
are not lacking, there are also a number of counterarguments. These 
can be divided into two groups. The fi rst is concerned with the negative 
normative implications that differentiated integration could have for Eu-
ropean integration. In particular, its coherence could be at stake. The ar-
gument goes that even now the relationship between the EU and national 
legal orders is not fully settled, and creating a third or further level as 
a result of differentiated integration would only make coherence a more 
remote ideal. The present solidifying, hard-won supranational structure 
would come under the additional strain of fragmentation, which could 
make it less and less intelligible and thus barely comprehensible to its 
subjects. This lack of transparency would necessarily detrimentally affect 
the already frail legitimacy of integration.64 What is worse, differentiated 
integration would mean a terrible blow to the bonds of solidarity and 
political community in whose absence the existence of European integra-
tion would be hard to imagine.65 
The second group of arguments against differentiated integration 
emphasises its inoperative practical side. This is not necessarily related 
to the fi rst group, as while many would oppose differentiated integration 
59  The Prum convention is the most recent example.
60   Shaw (n 39); EUobserver (n 34).
61  J Shaw, ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy’ (1998) 4 
European Law Journal  63-86.
62  F Tuytschaever, ‘EMU and the Catch-22 of EU Constitution-making’ in de Burca and 
Scott (eds), Constitutional Change in the EU, From Uniformity to Flexibility (Hart, 2000). 
63  Ibid 195.
64  S Weatherill, ‘“If I’d Wanted You to Understand I Would have Explained it Better”: What 
is the Purpose of the Provisions on Closer Co-operation Introduced by the Treaty of Amster-
dam?’ in O’Keeffe and Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty,  (Hart Publish-
ing, Oxford 1999) 37.
65  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Editorial’, (1997) 3 European Law Journal, 309-
312; R Harmsen, ‘A European Union of Variable Geometry: Problems and Perspectives’ 
(1994) 45 [109] N Ir Legal Q 129-130.
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on normative grounds and simultaneously aver its practical impossibility, 
others would fi nd it agreeable and perhaps even necessary but would be 
dissuaded from it due to an apparent lack of attainable workable means 
for its practical implementation. Indeed, the question whether differenti-
ated integration can ever be put into practice is a decisive one and should 
interest us. No matter what arguments can be produced for or against 
differentiated integration, and even if the former are more numerous and 
stronger than the latter, as we believe to be the case, the entire intellec-
tual endeavour is ultimately in vain if we cannot come up with evidence 
showing its viability in practice.    
So far this has not been the case. Despite numerous attempts, we 
have still not been offered a reliable institutional solution. Hard intellec-
tual work has been invested in looking for the means of striking the right 
balance between fl exibility and coherence to avoid the extremes of frag-
mentation or uniformity.66 There has been a constant search for a core 
that should remain intact, a periphery that could vary, and an appropri-
ate line dividing the two. The suggested criteria for division vary and have 
ranged from the core being formed either by Member States and policy 
sectors, or by the substantive commitments, principles and value-foun-
dations of integration.67 None of these have proved to be satisfactory for 
everyone. In addition, concrete institutional solutions, such as the sys-
tem of institutional representation, systemic relationships between con-
stituent entities, the role of the courts and the distribution of fi nancial 
benefi ts and burdens within a multi-dimensional European integration 
have been hard to conceive of.68 
Objective Prospects for Differentiated Integration
But what has been the reason for this? At the beginning, all the 
blame was put on the dominant classical constitutional vision. However, 
while this has been watered down, the practical inoperativeness of dif-
ferentiated integration has remained. This indicates that there must be 
another, deeper reason for it. In fact, there are two. The fi rst has to do 
with the context in which the need for differentiated integration arises. It 
is a situation of a long-lasting stand-off where differences between Mem-
ber States reach a level where it becomes increasingly obvious that no 
uniform solution meeting the needs of all Members can be found. Each 
proposal for differentiated integration is thus usually preceded by a con-
66  For a compilation of different approaches see De Burca and Scott (eds), Constitutional 
Change in the EU, From Uniformity to Flexibility (Hart, 2000). 
67  For a summary of all types of differentiation see Tuytschaever (n 4) and Stubb (n 5).
68  See, for example, Beaumont, Lyons and Walker (eds), Convergence and Divergence in 
European Public Law (Hart, 2002).
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siderable disagreement between Member States. However, at the same 
time any practically viable proposal for differentiated integration also re-
quires that these very same disagreeing Member States fi nd substantial 
agreement on the facets of differentiation. In other words, differentiated 
integration is necessary when the differences are so great that no rea-
sonable agreement can be found for all to continue following the same 
rules at the same pace, but is only possible when these deeply disagreeing 
Member States can agree on how to disagree.
The crux of the issue is thus whether Member States that cannot 
agree on co-operation in a particular fi eld can agree to disagree (and how 
much) in that fi eld while remaining part of the same overall structure. 
This is not an easy task, especially when disagreement is not so much 
due to certain objective reservations on the side of Member States, but 
stems from their subjective, usually strategic, economic or geo-political 
reckoning aimed at maximising their national interests. In such circum-
stances of strategic interest and power-play, it is hard to expect the Mem-
ber States involved to be ready to take a risk and trade the status quo for 
a more uncertain differentiated regime, in which it is by no means clear 
for whose strategic benefi t it would actually work, as it has not been tried 
out. 
However, there is an additional dimension to what has just been 
said. For Member States to be able to make what sometimes seems an 
almost quantum leap from uniformity marked by disagreement to agree-
ment on differentiation, they would need to possess appropriate guid-
ance. They would require a roadmap allowing them to understand how to 
conduct their practices to implement differentiated integration to every-
one’s satisfaction. The task of providing one rests on the shoulders of the 
legal theory of European integration. However, this latter has so far failed 
to carry out its duty. It is a fact that differentiated integration has been 
signifi cantly under-theorised.69 A theory which would imbue the process 
as a whole with a sense of coherence has simply been missing. But in 
the absence of the theoretical imagination of the means for coping with 
differentiated integration, it is impossible to expect the latter to function 
in practice. 
There is something in differentiated integration that has so far made 
it too hard a nut to be cracked by theory and even more by practice. 
This has to do, as Walker fi rst noted,70 with the kind of Europe that 
would emerge if differentiated integration were to be put in place. It would 
transform the existing bi-dimensional internal structure of integration, 
whereby one dimension is statist and the other supranational, into a 
69  Walker (n 13).
70  Ibid 356.
149CYELP 4 [2008] 131-150
multi-dimensional one. European integration would exist as a common 
whole composed of the Member States, a supranational level constituted 
by all the Member States, and then various other dimensions (levels) in 
which different Member States would participate in a different fashion 
to a different extent.  To put this kind of monster into practice, it would 
require an institutional solution that achieved three things at the same 
time: enabling those Member States which would like to integrate fur-
ther to do so, but without using their opportunity to the disadvantage 
of those which do not want to or cannot join them, while making sure 
that integration is preserved as a common whole. With all due fairness, 
none of the theories of European integration, especially not the dominant 
ones, are capable of offering a solution. All of them operate with a mon-
istic mindset, which means that they see the world in binary terms and 
postulate order as their highest normative ideal. This is in stark contrast 
with the multi-dimensional thinking necessitated by differentiated inte-
gration, which requires transcending exclusive (as well as exclusionary) 
binary logic and accepting complexity, fl exibility, and a more disordered 
type of order as a normal part of daily affairs and not as pathological oc-
currences.   
Conclusion
In this light, it seems that objective prospects for re-launching the 
fl exibility process, especially the third-order type of fl exibility, remain 
rather gloomy. The main and decisive reason for this lies in our intellec-
tual foundations. As heirs of the monistic mindset we lack the capacity 
to mastermind even viable theoretical models for multi-dimensional Eu-
ropean integration, which makes the latter’s practical realisation hardly 
possible. This means that in the light of the practical unavailability of dif-
ferentiated integration, heterogeneity in European integration will have to 
be dealt with in other ways. First and second-order fl exibility are at hand 
and have so far proven to be able to accommodate some diversity and 
eschew the majority of stalemates. The other option is to continue with 
the present politics of incrementalism and its ensuing package deals be-
tween Member States on the basis of quid pro quo incompletely theorised 
agreements.71 
71  Avbelj (n 42). The expression “incompletely theorized agreement” was coined by CR 
Sunstein, ‘Constitutional Agreements without Constitutional Theories’ (2000) 13 Ratio Iuris 
117-130. For the application of this approach within EU law see MP Maduro, ‘Contra-
punctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in Walker (ed), Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart, 2003) 502. This means that the actors manage to strike an agreement on 
a particular outcome without agreeing about the theories and reasons underlying this out-
come, since the latter is (usually) only possible after a short-term trade-off for some benefi ts 
in another domain of EU activities.  
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However, we believe that sooner or later these techniques will prove 
inadequate for European integration and a real move towards differenti-
ated integration will be necessary. A clear need for this is emerging al-
ready now in the Europe of 27,72 but the need will become all the more 
pressing and a solution perhaps even indispensable ten years from now 
when all the countries of the Western Balkans could join, not to mention 
the rising Turkish star on the Eastern horizon. If we do not take any theo-
retical step forward soon, we will, much more so than today, be faced with 
a very annoying, if not disturbing, situation with potentially destabilising 
and unsettling effects for European integration whereby this latter will 
be in genuine need of fl exible solutions, even those of a third order. How-
ever, we will be theoretically, and therefore a fortiori in practice, unable to 
come up with any workable and hence feasible models.   
  
72  The French proposal for a Mediterranean Union, Polish pressure to fi nd a privileged 
solution for Ukraine, etc. 
